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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELIZABETH A. DESCHLER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
FIREMAN'S FUND AMERICAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a corporation,

Case No. 18035

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for recovery of insurance benefits
under an accidental death policy that excludes coverage for
death resulting from the use of a device for aerial navigation.

The parties will be designated as they appeared below.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the lower court
granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff-beneficiary holding as a matter of law that the insured, who fell to his
death while flying in a kite being pulled by a motorboat, was
not using a "device for aerial navigation."

Judgment was

entered in plaintiff's favor on September 23, 1981.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Fireman's Fund American Life Insurance Company seeks a
reversal of the judgment of the lower court and entry of
judgment, as a matter of law, in its favor.
QUESTION ON APPEAL
Whether a kite designed and used as a recreational vehicle for controlled travel above the surface of water is a
device for aerial navigation, within the meaning of an accidental death insurance policy exclusion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Elizabeth A. Deschler is the widow of Robert W.
Deschler who died on July 26, 1980, from injuries suffered
when he fell with a kite at Starvation Reservoir, Utah.

Mr.

Deschler was flying the 17-foot wingspan kite at a height of
approximately forty to fifty feet above the surface of the
water when the towrope connecting the kite to a motorboat
disengaged.
beach.

A gust of wind then carried the kite toward the

Mr. Deschler fell to the ground, causing the injuries

which resulted in his death.

[R. 17-18].

At the time of the accident, Mr. Deschler was insured
under a group accidental death policy written by defendant
Fireman's Fund American Life Insurance Company and issued to
the Utah State Employees Credit Union, Master Policy Number

-2-
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DVA 525-131.

Plaintiff is the named beneficiary under the

Accidental Death and Dismemberment Coverage of said policy.
The policy provides benefits in the event of accidental death
of the insured, subject to the following exclusion:
EXCLUSIONS
The policy does not cover any loss, fatal or nonfatal, caused by or resulting from (1) injuries
sustained in consequence of riding as a passenger
or otherwise in any vehicle or device for aerial
navigation, • • •
The sole issue presented to the lower court was whether
the exclusion from coverage of any loss resulting from the
use of a vehicle or device for aerial navigation bars the
plaintiff's claim to the proceeds.

[R. 23-30; 41-50].

The parties submitted affidavits from the manufacturer of
the kite and experienced users of the device which are in
substantial agreement as to the design, use and operation of
the kite.

[R. 31-33; 51-52; 54-55; 56-57].

The kite at

issue in this case was constructed of aircraft aluminum and
dacron sail cloth.
17 feet.

It weighed 40 lbs. and had a wingspan of

The operator sits in a seat made of seat-belt web-

bing equipped with a safety belt.

The seat itself is attach-

ed to a control bar which is used to navigate the kite.

[R.

32] •
The kite and operator are lifted

airbo~ne

behind a motor-

boat and are kept aloft by the airfoil design of the kite
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which creates lift and retards downward motion.

[R. 32].

While in flight, the operator controls and navigates the
craft by pushing the control bar to the left or right to control lateral direction, or up and down to control the ascent
or descent.

[R. 33, 54, 56].

While being towed, the opera-

tor is not randomly drifting or descending through the air,
but may fly in any direction he chooses to navigate, up or
down, right or left and, to some extent, the operator may
even control the speed of the craft.

[R. 33, 54, 56].

The

boat which tows the kite with a 250-300 foot rope simply dictates the general course of travel.

[R. 33].

To terminate

the flight, the operator releases the tow-rope and navigates
to a landing spot on the water near the shoreline.

[R. 33].

Mr. Deschler was an avid and proficient user of the craft
and had gone "kiting" virtually every weekend for years prior
to his death.

[R. 51].

Flying the kite obviously carried an attendant risk of
death or serious injury.

[R. 52].

Like a hang-glider, the

kite could stall on too steep a turn or maneuver.
56-57].

[R. 54-55;

While airborne, the kite was also subject to wind

gusts and air currents that can cause the operator to lose
control and descend too rapidly.

[R. 55; 56-57].

While air-

borne, Mr. Deschler encountered such a wind gust that caused

-4-
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the craft to crash to the ground from a height of at least
40-50 feet.

[R. 17].

On the basis of the affidavits, Answers to Interrogatories, photographs of the kite in flight, and stipulated
terms of the insurance policy, both parties filed motions for
summary judgment.

The lower court granted plaintiff's motion

and denied defendant's motion without discussion, impliedly
holding that the kite the deceased was flying at the time of
his death was not a device for aerial navigation.

[R. 90-91].

ARGUMENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW, ROBERT W. DESCHLER'S
DEATH WAS THE RESULT AN AN "INJURY SUSTAINED IN CONSEQUENCE OF RIDING AS A PASSENGER OR OTHERWISE IN A VEHICLE OR DEVICE
FOR AERIAL NAVIGATION," AN EXCLUDED RISK
UNDER THE INSURANCE CONTRACT.

The question of what constitutes a "vehicle or device for
aerial navigation", within the meaning of an accidental death
policy exclusion, is a matter of first impression in this
jurisdiction.

Other courts, however, under virtually identi-

cal circumstances have uniformly held that recreational use
of any kite or glider-like device which travels by air is a
hazardous activity intended to be covered by the exclusion.
In construing contracts of insurance, including coverage
exclusions, normal rules of construction apply.

Words are to

be give their usual and ordinary accepted meaning and, unless
there is some ambiguity or uncertainty ih the language, the
-5-
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policy is to be enforced according to its terms.

St. Paul

Fire and Marine Insurance v. Commercial Union Assurance, 606
P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 1980); Bergera v. Ideal National Life
Insurance Company, 524 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 1974).
The conclusion the courts have reached in prior cases is
not only supported by the ordinarily accepted meaning of the
policy language, but also by the clear logic of applying the
exclusion, as it was intended, to conduct that experience has
shown to be hazardous to life and limb.
In a case strikingly similar to the present action the
Georgia Court of Appeals in Fireman's Fund American Life
Insurance Company v•·Long, 251 S.E.2d 133 (Ga.App. 1978)
reversed a summary judgment for the beneficiary under an accidental death policy and directed that judgment be entered
for the defendant insurer.

In that case the decedent had

died while operating a "hang-glider" designed to be towed
behind a motor vehicle.

Decedent hooked one end of the tow-

rope to the bumper of a van and the other to the hand-release
control of his glider.

The van pulled out and decedent,

while seated in a swing-like harness, ran with the kite until
airborne.

Upon reaching an altitude of 100 feet, the tow-

rope disengaged, either accidentally or by means of the handrelease control, and the decedent nose-dived to the ground;

-6- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the fall resulting in the injuries from which he died several
hours later.
The beneficiary under an accidental death policy insuring
the deceased brought suit to recover policy benefits.

The

defendant insurer moved for summary judgment on the basis of
a policy provision excluding coverage for "loss caused by or
resulting from • • • [t]ravel or flight in any vehicle or
device for aerial navigation • • • • " Id. at 134.

The trial

court denied defendant's motion and granted a cross-motion
for summary judgment in favor of the beneficiary.

The defen-

dant appealed.
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the
hang-glider was indeed a "vehicle or device for aerial navigation" within the policy exclusion.

The court stated:

Appellant contends that the glider constitutes a
"vehicle or device for aerial navigation" within the
purview of the policy's aviation exclusion. We
agree with this contention. Navigation is defined
as "the science or art of conducting ships or aircraft from one place to another." Webster's Third
New International Dictionary, (1966), p. 1509.
251 S.E.2d at 134.

The appeals court found that the hang-

glider qualified as an "aircraft" and the policy exclusion
was applicable.

The court therefore entered judgment in

favor of the insurance company.

Accord Fielder v. Farmer's

New World Life Insurance Company, 435 F.Supp. 912 (C.D. Cal.
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1977) [operation of hang-glider falls within excluded risk of
"travel or flight in an aircraft."]
In Wilson

v~

Insurance Company of North America, 453

F.Supp. 732 (N.D. Cal. 1978), the Federal Court for the
Northern District of California, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer in an action to recover accidental death benefits.

In

that case the court was asked to decide whether operation of
a "hang-kite" constituted "travel or flight in any vehicle or
device for aerial navigation", as those terms were used in an
exclusion clause in a group accidental death policy.
The undisputed facts established that the operator of the
"hang-kite" controls the direction of the flight by use of a
control bar.

By shifting his weight on the bar he can turn

the vehicle to the right or left, and ascend or descend.

In

contrast to a glider which is designed like a wing, the
"hang-kite" is structurally patterned after a parachute.

Id.

at 733.
The plaintiff sought to capitalize on this structural
distinction between the devices, arguing that since the
"hang-kite" is patterned after a parachute, it is not an
"aircraft" and therefore not navigable, since the term "navigation" means "piloting an aircraft."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

The court rejected plaintiff's argument and granted summary judgment for the defendant insurer emphasizing the logic
of applying the exclusion to this type of activity:
[I]n the instant case, the inquiry concerns not only
the status of a hang-kite as an "aircraft", but also
the act of operating it as "piloting" an aircraft.
For this reason, the designer of decedent's hangkite could swear in two separate statements given to
plaintiff and defendant, respectfully, without contradicting himself that the hang-kite he designed
for decedent was patterned after a parachute and
that the means of control was such that the decedent
could and did navigate his craft. Construing the
exclusionary language in the brochure in its entirety rather than by its divisible parts, it is
clear that the insured would reasonably expect that
the operation of a hang-kite would constitute just
the type of activity that the policy was not intended to cover. Defendant, Insurance Company of
North American, has, therefore, met its burden of
showing that the terms of its policy conform to the
reasonable expectation of the insured, and, accordingly, is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law.
453 F.Supp. at 735.
The most recent case dealing with a kite-like device and
an "aerial navigation" exclusion is Cabell v. World Service
Life Insurance Company, 599 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)
where the Civil Court of Appeals for Texas affirmed a judgment for the insurer in a declaratory action upon a group
life insurance policy.
The insured in Cabell died when the "para-plane" he was
operating stalled in mid-air and nose-dived to the ground.
The beneficiary made demand on the insurer for payment of
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benefits whereupon the insurance company instituted a declaratory judgment action to determine its liability.
The "para-plane" device at issue in Cabell was controlled
by the operator by means of "steering toggles."

Like a kite

or glider, the "para-plane" was highly and used the aerodynamic principles of an airfoil to allow the operator to fly
in the direction he chooses.

Although patterned after a

parachute, the wing-type para-plane is used for sport jumping, unlike the conventional parachute used primarily for
emergency exits from aircraft.

Id. at 652.

Trial was to the court, without a jury.

The insurer con-

tended that the death was an excluded risk since it resulted
from an injury sustained while "riding as a passenger or
otherwise in any vehicle or device for aerial navigation," a
specific coverage exclusion.

The trial court agreed and

entered judgment for the insurer.
On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals for Texas affirmed.

In doing so it brushed aside the appellant-beneficiary's

proferred technical definitions of "aerial navigation,"
choosing instead to the follow the more common and ordinary
definitions of those terms.

The court stated:

For example, appellant's own cited authority, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged), gives these definitions as preferred to
those suggested by appellant:
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"Aerial - of, or belonging to the air or atmosphere."
"To navigate - to direct one's course through
any medium; specifically to operate an airplane
or airship."
By these definitions, aerial navigation would simply
mean to direct one's course through the air. we
believe such a definition would be closer to the
commonly understood and accepted meaning of the term
aerial navigation than the narrow ones suggested by
appellant. Moreover, that general interpretation
has received the sanction of the courts. In Smith
v. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association,
supra, the Supreme Court of Kansas defined "participating in aeronautics or air travel" as "to share in
sailing or floating in the air." The chute in question here more than meets the test of that def inition. It did not merely float or drift uncontrollably through the air, but was maneuverable to the
extent that its direction, speed and rate of descent
could be controlled with a considerble degree of
accuracy. The fact that it had no power, except for
the air, or that it could not travel upward or horizontally for great distances, is not significant.
It could be maneuvered or directed through the air,
and we think that the insurance policy and the insured must have contemplated that any device capable
of doing that was a device for aerial navigation.
599 S.W.2d at 654.
In a final attempt to find coverage, appellant argued
that if the policy intended to exclude accidents involving
para-planes it should have explicitly done so; the language
of the policy exclusion is therefore ambiguous and must be
construed against the drafter.
The appeals court rejected this argument as well, stating:
Of course, the policy could have specifically named
every known or conceivable type of device for aerial
navigation had the company chosen to do so, but such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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specificity is not necessary when the general term,
by its common and ordinary meaning, clearly includes
the device in question.
599 S.W.2d at 654.
The foregoing discussion contains all reported cases
dealing with kite or glider devices in the context of an
insurance policy "aerial navigation" exclusion.

The cases

uniformly hold that such vehicles are devices for aerial
navigation.
Several courts have examined the analogous question of
whether a parachute is a "device for aerial navigation" for
purposes of an insurance policy exclusion.

While these cases

are factually distinguishable (based on the nature and operation of a parachute vis-a-vis a kite or glider), they provide additional authority and analytical assistance for defendant's position in this case.
The most recent case dealing with a parachute and an
"aerial navigation" exclusion is Edison v. Reliable Life
Insurance Company, 495 F.Supp. 484 (W.D. Wash. 1980).

In

that case the plaintiff-beneficiary brought suit against the
defendant insurer to recover policy benefits for the death of
the insured who lost his life when his parachute failed to
open during a sport parachuting event.

The insured denied

coverage and moved for summary judgment on the ground that
the insured's cause of death was a result of his riding in a
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"device for aerial navigation," an excluded risk under the
policy.

Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment,

arguing that since the exclusion did not mention sport parachutes specifically the language of the exclusion is ambiguous and should be interpreted in favor of the insured.
The court granted the defendant-insurer's motion for summary judgment stating:
In my view, any parachute is "a device for
aerial navigation." Webster defines "navigation" as
"the act or practice of navigating." "Navigate" is
defined as "to travel by ship." "Aerial navigation"
therefore means "to travel by air." A parachute is
clearly a device in which to travel by air.
495 F.Supp. at 496.
As further support for its position, the court made an
important distinction based upon the purpose for which the
device was being used at the time of the accident, a distinction equally applicable to the case at bar.
There has been some discussion as to the distinction between parachutes as "safety devices" and
parachutes for "sporting purposes." In my view the
distinction lies not in the design or construction
of the parachute, but rather the purposes for which
it is used. If a person riding as a passenger in a
certified aircraft is forced to use a parachute to
save himself from disaster because of some crisis
which affects him as a passenger, he might well be
covered by the policy until he safely reaches the
ground. But one who is riding as a passenger in a
certified aircraft loses his status as such when he
voluntarily leaves the plane, choosing an alternate
means of returning to earth. In the former illustration, if the parachute fails to open, the insured
dies as a consequence of having been riding as a
passenger in a certified aircraft. In the later
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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illustration, if the parachute fails to open, the
insured dies as a consequence of riding in a device
for aerial navigation which has been specifically
excluded from the policy.
There has also been much discussion about the
maneuverability of various types of parachutes.
Such discussion, in my view, is irrelevant since all
parachutes are maneuverable to some degree. In any
event, no such distinctions are relevant here since
the device, a parachute package, in which the insured had chosen to ride and was riding at the time
of his death was neither designed nor intended as a
safety device, but was designed and intended to be
maneuverable.
495 F.Supp at 486-87 [footnotes omitted].
Other courts have reached the same holding in parachute
cases.

See

~'

Smith v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident

Association, 258 P.2d 993 (Kan. 1953) ["participating in
aeronautics", as used in insurance policy exclusion, means to
"share in sailing or floating in air" and includes sport
parachuting.]
~,

Contra Childress v. Continental Casualty Com-

461 F.Supp. 704 (E.D. La. 1978) [sport parachute is not

"device for aerial navigation."]
Childress v. Continental Casualty Company, supra, is the
only recent case holding that a parachute is not a "device
for aerial navigation" within the meaning of an insurance
policy exclusion.

The Childress opinion was criticized by

the federal district court in Edison v. Reliable Life Insurance Company, 495 F.Supp. 484, 487 (W.D. Wash. 1980) [discussed on prior page], and offers little assistance to the
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court in deciding the case at bar.

In Childress, the court

properly reasoned that since the policy did not define "device for aerial navigation," the court must look to common
and ordinary definitions.

Inexplicably, the court then

analyzed the common definition of "parachute" rather than the
policy terms "aerial navigation."

The court then stated,

without offering any supporting reasoning, that a parachute
is not a "device for aerial navigation."
CONCLUSION
By common dictionary definition, the terms "aerial navigation" mean "to direct one's course through the air."

Each

and every court which has considered the question of whether
a kite or glider device is a "device for aerial navigation",
within the meaning of an insurance policy exclusion, has held
that it is.

With limited exception, analogous authority

dealing with parachutes is in accord.
Logic and reason compel a similar conclusion in this
case.

Mr. Deschler was not forced to use the kite he was

piloting at the time of the accident; the kite was not an
emergency device, but was purposefully used for recreational
enjoyment.

Mr. Deschler, as an experienced operator, did not

simply drift through the air while piloting the kite, but was
able to choose his course of travel.

He could navigate in

whichever direction he chose, up or down, right or left, and
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could even control his rate of speed to some extent.

Mr.

Deschler was clearly able to travel or direct his course
through the air in the same manner as the insureds in the
cases discussed above.
The hazardous nature of this type of activity and its
attendant risk of loss of life or limb is well-known.

The

exclusion at issue in this case is a modification of earlier
aviation exclusions and is clearly targeted to deal with the
new risks created by the spreading popularity of sport
kiting, gliding and parachuting.

Applying the usual and

ordinary accepted meaning to the policy language, it is
unequivocally clear that the exclusion was contemplated and
designed to avoid the specific risk to which the deceased
exposed himself when he left the surface of the water to
travel by air behind the motor boat.
The judgment of the lower court, if affirmed, would make
Utah a minority of one on this seemingly clear issue.

The

better reasoned, if not compelling, view is that devices of
the type used by Robert Deschler are devices for "aerial
navigation" and, no factual dispute remaining, the judgment
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of the lower court should be reversed and judgment entered
for defendant as a matter of law.
Dated this

;3t!: day of January, 1982.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

ByE~~

Bruce H. Jensen
Attorneys for Fireman's Fund
American Life Insurance
Company

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-17-

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand delivered two (2) true
and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to
Henry S. Nygaard, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent,
1100 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on
this 14th day of January, 1982.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

